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I.

Introduction

Each year, April 15 rings a familiar bell of dread for many U.S. tax filers, perhaps less because
of a fear of missing the deadline to file one's federal income tax return than for its reminder of an
impending, unpleasant task. Yet many low- and moderate-income (LMI) households in the U.S.
look forward to filing their federal tax returns and receiving their tax refund—which comprises a
substantial proportion of their yearly income—so much that they often file as early as possible.
This impatience to file taxes is understandable. Tax refunds act as windfalls that LMI filers can
use to pay down debt, save, get caught up on bills, make large purchases, and enjoy modest
“splurges” like eating out (Sykes et al. 2015). The Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC) comprises
a significant proportion of refunds and income for many working low-income tax filers,
especially households with children. For example, in the 2019 tax year, the maximum benefit for
a Head of Household filer with three or more children and $15,000 in earnings was $6,557, or
44% of their earned income.
Prior to the 2017 tax season, tax filers did not have long to wait to receive their refunds;
they could often expect to receive their refunds within seven to ten days if they filed
electronically and opted to receive their refund via direct deposit. Refund anticipation loans
(RALs) offered by paid tax preparers give filers even quicker access to expected refunds. Yet,
starting with the 2017 tax season, a newly implemented tax law—the Protecting Americans from
Tax Hikes Act (PATH Act) of 2015—requires the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) to provide
more time to review and verify wage income to help detect and reduce fraudulent or erroneous
EITC and Additional Child Tax Credit (ACTC) claims. Under the PATH Act rule, the IRS began
withholding refunds until at least February 15 for filers claiming the EITC or the ACTC,
effectively delaying the receipt of refunds until at least late February.
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The EITC enjoys bipartisan support for its low administrative costs (Treasury Inspector
General for Tax Administration [TIGTA] 2011) and effectiveness in raising incomes and lifting
households out of poverty (Gundersen and Ziliak 2004; Hardy, Smeeding, and Ziliak 2018;
Hoynes and Patel 2018). At the same time, around a quarter of EITC payments were made
improperly in 2017 and the IRS was found to be out of compliance with the Improper Payments
Elimination and Recovery Act (IPERA) of 2010 (TIGTA 2018). Following the implementation
of the PATH Act, the IRS had delayed almost $58 billion in refunds from 10.7 million tax
returns of filers who claimed the EITC and/or ACTC by February 15 of the most recent tax
season. By February 23, 2019, the IRS identified 3,529 returns (0.03% of delayed returns) it
determined to contain fraudulent EITC and/or ACTC claims, blocking the allocation of $12.2
million in fraudulent refunds (0.02% of delayed refunds) (TIGTA 2019). To put these fraudulent
refund payments in perspective, 16% of federal income tax obligations (an average of over $400
billion a year) go unpaid due to intentional and unintentional evasion (Gale and Krupkin 2019).
Thus, the newly implemented refund delays appear to have effectively interdicted a mere
fraction of total improper EITC and ACTC payments. The question, therefore, is to whether a
small rate of fraud detection through the IRS’ refund delays under the PATH Act are worth the
taxpayer burdens and unintended negative consequences for low-income households. Many LMI
households may need to find ways to offset a multiple-week delay for a large and expected tax
refund, such as through increased borrowing and/or decreased spending, which may amplify risk
for material hardship, particularly if tax filers plan to use the refund to make critical payments
and purchases.
The purpose of this study is to determine whether refund delays may have unintended
consequences with respect to material hardship and the accumulation of unsecured debt among
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LMI households. To accomplish this, we leveraged unique administrative and survey data and
employed a difference-in-differences approach as an identification strategy. We limited the
sample to EITC recipients and relied on the time discontinuity in the new rule’s dates to identify
early filers (treatment group) and non-early filers (comparison group) in 2016 (pre-treatment
period) and 2017 (post-treatment period). We then compared the changes in outcomes over time
among EITC recipients in the treatment group relative to those in the comparison group. Several
key findings emerged from the analysis. First, tax filing patterns appeared similar in 2016 and
2017, signaling the lack of changes in filing behaviors among tax filers after the new reform.
Second, the incidence of food insecurity increased among early EITC filers relative to later EITC
filers following the implementation of the PATH Act. The magnitude of these negative effects
appeared larger for households with greater financial vulnerability. Moreover, in a few models,
we found that the relative incidence of skipped housing bills decreased among early EITC filers
relative to later EITC filers after the tax reform. Given the statutory intent of the EITC to boost
incomes and lift families out of poverty, our findings can help policymakers assess the tradeoffs
between this goal and their aim to eliminate fraud and errors and reduce improper payments.
II.

Background

A. The Earned Income Tax Credit and Household Financial Security
Tax filing is an extremely common experience in the U.S.; almost 153 million individual income
tax returns were filed in 2018 and almost 80 percent of households receive a tax refund (IRS
2019b). The tax refund is important for LMI tax filers in particular, as it often represents the
single largest payment they will receive all year (Roll et al. 2018). These households often use
the receipt of the tax refund as an opportunity to build savings and pay down debt (Despard et al.
2015; Sykes et al. 2015; Mendenhall et al. 2012; Grinstein-Weiss et al. 2015), as well as cover
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necessary expenses like paying off overdue bills, making home or car repairs, and making large
purchases (Sykes et al. 2015; Shaefer, Song, and Williams Shanks 2013; Mendenhall et al. 2012;
Tach and Greene 2014). Tax refunds can be especially valuable for LMI households due to the
receipt of the federal EITC, a fully refundable tax credit that depends on a household’s earned
income in the prior year, their filing status (e.g., single, married filing jointly), and the number of
qualifying children claimed on the tax form. Figure 1 outlines the structure of the credit, which
increases with every additional dollar a qualifying household earns until reaching a maximum
(the “phase-in” range), remains constant over a set income range, and then begins to decline once
a household’s income exceeds a given threshold (the “phase-out” range).
[Insert Figure 1 Here]
The actual dollar value of the EITC can be substantial—the average value of the EITC
was $2,476 in the 2018 tax year (IRS 2018a). However, the value of this credit depends heavily
on the income and composition of a household: Those without qualifying children could receive
a maximum EITC of $519, while households with three or more qualifying children could
receive a maximum credit of $6,431 in the 2018 tax year. The generosity of the EITC makes it
one of the most robust antipoverty programs in the U.S.; in 2017, the EITC lifted almost six
million people (including three million children) out of poverty (Center on Budget and Policy
Priorities 2019).
A large body of research has evaluated the relationship between the EITC and household
financial security outcomes. This research demonstrates that the receipt of the credit is integral in
various ways to the lives and finances of LMI households. In terms of financial outcomes, the
EITC has been shown to lead to higher rates of labor force participation and reduced poverty
rates (Eissa and Liebman 1996; Ellwood 2000; Gundersen and Ziliak 2004; Meyer and
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Rosenbaum 2001; Hotz, Mullin, and Scholz 2006; Hoynes and Patel 2018; Meyer 2010), as well
as improvements in household balance sheet metrics like increased savings and reduced
unsecured debt (Shaefer, Song, and Williams Shanks 2013; Jones and Michelmore 2018). At the
same time, the receipt of the EITC is also associated with an array of secondary effects on
households that have implications for both their short- and long-term well-being, including
improved health and nutrition outcomes (Averett and Wang 2013; Evans and Garthwaite 2014;
Hoynes, Miller, and Simon 2015; McGranahan and Schanzenbach 2013; Rehkopf, Strully, and
Dow 2014), and improved educational outcomes (Manoli and Turner 2018; Dahl and Lochner
2012).
B. Financial Precarity in Low-Income Households
The EITC is particularly valuable for LMI households given the relatively high degree of
budgetary constraints, financial precarity, and hardship they experience. As stated above, the
receipt of the tax refund is one of the few times during the year that many LMI households can
build their savings, particularly when their refund is bolstered through the receipt of large credits
like the EITC. Building savings is important for LMI households, as these households typically
hold extremely low levels of liquid assets to mitigate financial emergencies. A nationally
representative survey found that two-thirds of LMI households (those making under $40,000 a
year) could not handle a modest emergency expense using liquid savings or a credit card they
could pay off within a month (Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System 2016). This
low level of liquidity is partially explained by the fact that LMI households often lack access to
banking services offering affordable credit and short-term savings products (Barr 2007; Blank
and Barr 2009; Mullainathan and Shafir 2009) and are often subject to asset limits in public
programs like the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP) that disincentivize
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savings (Neuberger, Greenstein, and Orszag 2006; O’Brien 2008; Sherraden and Barr 2005). Yet
perhaps the major reason that LMI households struggle to save is due to the fact that their
budgets are largely consumed by necessary expenditures (Schanzenbach et al. 2016). LMI
households’ incomes in a typical month are simply not high enough, relative to their expenses, to
save regularly and build a substantial liquidity buffer in the absence of large lump sum payouts
like the EITC and, more broadly, the tax refund.
On the other side of the balance sheet, debt burdens are also an issue for many LMI
households. Debt ownership is a common experience in the U.S., with roughly 80 percent of
adults in 2015 reporting some debt (The Pew Charitable Trusts 2015). However, LMI
households have debt-to-income ratios that are substantially greater than those in higher-income
households and are more likely to have debts in collections (The Aspen Institute 2018). These
relatively high debt burdens in LMI households are likely affected by similar factors underlying
the low rates of savings in these households, such as tight budgets and a lack of affordable
banking and credit products. However, evidence also indicates that households experiencing
persistent economic scarcity tend to both over-borrow and utilize high-cost credit products in
order to manage their present financial obligations (Shah, Mullainathan, and Shafir 2012;
Mullainathan and Shafir 2013). These debt issues have implications for households beyond the
balance sheet, as unsustainable debt burdens can lead to broader financial problems including
bankruptcy or the deterioration of credit scores, and can cause physical and mental health
problems over the long-term (Clayton, Liñares-Zegarra, and Wilson 2015).
While LMI households struggle to save for emergencies and manage their debts, they
also face a relatively high degree of exposure to financial shocks, such as an unexpected decline
in income (e.g., from the loss of a job) or increase in expenses (e.g., from a major car repair or
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hospitalization). LMI households are more likely to experience these shocks (Acs, Loprest, and
Nichols 2009; Chase et al. 2011) which cost an average of between $1,500 and $2,000 (Collins
and Gjertson 2013; Searle and Köppe 2014) and consume a higher percentage of an LMI
household’s budget relative to an equivalent shock in a higher-income household. Experiencing
these shocks without an adequate savings or liquidity buffer may result in households
experiencing an array of hardships such as housing instability, food insecurity, missing essential
bill payments, or skipping necessary medical care (Despard et al. 2018; Heflin 2016; Leete and
Bania 2010; McKernan, Ratcliffe, and Vinopal 2009). These hardships, in turn, can have
substantial negative implications for downstream household outcomes including child
developmental problems (Gershoff, Aber, Raver, & Lennon, 2007; Rauh et al., 2004), the
experience of housing insecurity (Desmond and Kimbro 2015), and mental and physical health
issues (Heflin and Iceland 2009; Palar et al. 2016; Sullivan, Turner, and Danziger 2008; Whittle
et al. 2015).
Given the demonstrated levels of financial precarity in LMI households, the receipt of the
EITC and the tax refund more generally represents an infrequent but often predictable windfall
(Epley and Gneezy 2007) enabling financial behaviors that may be more difficult through the
rest of the year, such as building savings and paying down debts. As such, it provides a means
for households to create a financial buffer against future shocks and subsequent hardships, and
avoid the debts they have accrued throughout the year from becoming unsustainable.
C. The PATH Act and Tax Refund Delays
The PATH Act made several changes to existing tax law, including expanding the Work
Opportunity Tax Credit for employers and updating tax filing regulations for wrongfullyincarcerated individuals and tax filers using Individual Taxpayer Identification Numbers (IRS
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2019c). Beginning in 2017, the PATH Act also instituted additional safeguards against
fraudulent or erroneous claims of the EITC and ACTC on tax returns (IRS 2018b), which
included an additional review period to verify the wages reported on any tax returns claiming the
EITC and ACTC. Whereas previously the IRS sent most tax refunds to households seven to ten
days after tax filing, the PATH Act resulted in the IRS holding the entirety of the tax refund for
EITC and ACTC claimants until at least February 15 of the 2017 tax season. However, even
though February 15 was the earliest date by which the IRS would release refunds for EITC and
ACTC claimants, tax filers were instructed to not expect their refunds until at least the week of
February 27 (IRS 2019a). As the 2017 tax season opened on January 23, this delay meant that
early tax filers claiming the EITC or ACTC could potentially expect multiple-week delays in
receiving their tax refund, relative to prior years.
There is some evidence of the extent to which tax filers may have experienced these
delays. EITC and ACTC filers tend to file their taxes much earlier in the tax season than filers
not claiming these credits; 56 percent of LMI online tax filers using free, online tax filing
software and claiming the EITC or ACTC filed their taxes before February 15 in 2016 (Maag,
Roll, and Oliphant 2016), suggesting that roughly half of this population could be potentially
affected by a multiple-week delay. An analysis of IRS data also indicates that the issuance of
EITC and ACTC refunds was delayed by an average of two weeks in 2017, relative to prior tax
seasons (Aladangady et al. 2018). Additionally, the number of RALs—which allow tax filers to
borrow against their anticipated refund amount in order to get immediate access to the funds
promised by the refund—almost quadrupled between 2016 and 2017 (Aladangady et al. 2018;
see footnote 7). It is possible this increase in RALs was due to households seeking to offset the
anticipated delay in refund receipt, though the degree to which this increase in RALs was caused
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by the refund delay and not some other unrelated factor (e.g., tax preparation companies'
marketing efforts) is unclear.
Two studies have investigated the potential and realized impacts of these refund delays
on EITC and ACTC claimants. Maag et al. (2016) used a combination of administrative tax data
and survey data to explore the financial circumstances of the households most likely to be
affected by the refund delay: EITC and ACTC claimants with children who filed their taxes early
in 2016. Their work shows that over 80 percent of these filers experienced extremely high rates
of financial hardship such as skipping essential bills or experiencing food insecurity in the
months prior to tax filing, about 40 percent relied on often costly alternative financial services
such as payday loans, 70 percent experienced a financial shock such as a decline in income or a
major expense, and fewer than half reported being able to manage a modest emergency expense.
Survey respondents in this study were also asked about the degree to which a hypothetical one,
two, three, or four week delay in a tax refund would negatively affect their finances, with the
length of delay being shown at random to a given respondent. As the length of the delay
randomly shown to filers increased, so too did the anticipated effect of the delay; 31 percent of
respondents said that even a one-week delay would negatively affect their finances at least
somewhat, while over 50 percent of respondents said a three- or four-week delay would
negatively affect their finances to the same degree. Finally, this research also indicates that early
filing EITC and ACTC claimants were largely unaware of the coming delays in tax refund
delivery, as 91 percent reported not hearing anything about the refund delay in the coming tax
season.
In a related study using high-frequency transaction data on credit, debit, and electronic
transactions, Aladangady et al. (2018) investigated changes in household consumption spending
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as a result of the IRS’ delay in issuing tax refunds. Their analysis shows that household
expenditures among EITC claimants spike during the week of tax refund issuance and remain
higher than average over the subsequent two weeks, and they find no evidence that households
shift their purchases forward in time because they anticipate receiving a refund in the future.
They also find that non-trivial portions of EITC expenditures go to grocery stores and
restaurants, as well as at “general merchandise” stores (which are often both grocery and
department stores, e.g., Wal-Mart Superstores), indicating that EITC recipients may be delaying
essential purchases like food in the absence of the tax refund.
Our study builds on these two pieces of research, as well as the broader literatures on the
effects of the tax refund and large tax credits like the EITC. The prior research on tax refunds
and the EITC has typically focused on the impacts of receiving the large lump sum payments,
while prior work on the refund delay specifically has focused on the anticipated impacts of the
delay and household consumption responses to the delay. Our work, by contrast, investigates the
realized impacts of even modest delays in the expected large, lump sum payments offered by the
tax refund on an array of household outcomes, including the experience of financial and medical
hardships, food insecurity, and debt accrual.
III.

Data

This paper leverages a unique dataset combining administrative income and tax records with
longitudinal survey data on LMI households collected in 2016 and 2017, corresponding to tax
years 2015 and 2016.1 Administrative data come from LMI tax filers who used the free
TurboTax Freedom Edition (TTFE) online tax preparation and filing platform to complete their

1

The data were collected through the Refund to Savings (R2S) Initiative, a research collaboration between
Washington University in St. Louis, Duke University, and Intuit Inc., the makers of TurboTax.
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taxes.2 While eligibility criteria varies slightly year to year, in 2017 a qualifying tax household
had to earn no more than $33,000 in adjusted gross income (AGI), receive the EITC, or have an
active duty military member in their household while earning no more than $64,000 in AGI.
Almost all TTFE filers (over 98.4 percent in 2017) qualified for the free tax filing software
according to the first two criteria. Administrative tax records include precise information on tax
household’s filing status, dependents, household income, the amount of received federal EITC,
federal and state tax refund sizes, and the state of residence. In addition to these administrative
data, the study relies on data from the Household Financial Survey (HFS). The HFS is an annual
national household survey administered immediately after tax filing to a random sample of TTFE
filers who have consented to participate in the survey. Those who complete the first survey wave
are invited to participate in the follow-up survey roughly six months after tax filing. We are thus
able to observe each respondent in two time periods throughout the year. Each wave of the HFS
contains information about tax filers’ demographic and financial characteristics that is not
observable through administrative records, which includes the experience of hardships and
financial shocks, asset ownership, debt levels, and additional demographic information.
Administrative tax records were merged with the HFS data to generate the final dataset for the
analysis. While response rates vary marginally year-to-year, 5.7 percent of invited TTFE filers
responded to the first survey in 2017. Though survey response rates were low, research from
prior years generally points to relatively few differences between all TTFE users and those who
opt to complete the survey, even as survey respondents do tend to have slightly higher incomes
(Grinstein-Weiss et al. 2015). Of those who completed the first survey wave in 2017, 34 percent
took part in the second survey.

2

The TTFE tax preparation and tax filing software is offered by Intuit, Inc. for free as part of the IRS Free File
Alliance to qualifying LMI households (https://freefilealliance.org/).
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IV.

Study Sample

The study sample was limited to EITC-receiving households that participated in both survey
waves, received a federal tax refund, completed their taxes before the filing deadline, and had
non-missing data on key demographic and financial characteristics. A small share of households
(0.49 percent of the LMI sample) that received the Child Tax Credit (CTC) but not the EITC was
excluded from the sample. In total, 5,333 households were included in the analytical sample:
3,246 in 2016 and 2,087 in 2017. We used three sample specifications of EITC recipients for the
primary analysis. In the full sample, the treatment group consisted of EITC recipients who filed
their taxes before February 15th (early filers) and the comparison group included EITC recipients
who completed taxes on or after February 15th (non-early filers) (Sample 1, N=5,333).
Considering that filing taxes on, for example, February 14th may not result in a substantially
longer period of waiting for the refund than filing on February 15th, we constructed a separate
treatment group restricted to early filers who completed their taxes before February 1st—and thus
were most likely to be affected by the new rules—leaving the comparison group unchanged
(Sample 2, N=3,890). Finally, since households filing very late in the tax season may differ from
very early filers (Grinstein-Weiss et al. 2015), we constructed a third sample limiting the
comparison group to households that prepared their refunds on or soon after February 15th
(between February 15th and March 15th), and the treatment group consisted of the earliest tax
filers who prepared taxes before February 1st (Sample 3, N=2,564).
Table 1 presents summary statistics for the full sample of EITC recipients (Sample 1)
measured at the time of tax filing prior to policy implementation in 2016. Despite limiting the
sample to EITC-receiving households, substantial differences are observed between early and
non-early filers in terms of demographic and financial characteristics. For example, compared to
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late filers, higher proportions of early filers were married (26.8 percent), non-students (79.2
percent), and employed full-time (49 percent), had lower educational attainment (50.2 percent
had less than Bachelor’s degree), and had dependents in a household (59.8 percent). Both groups
reported experiencing unexpected income and expense shocks at similar rates six months prior to
tax filing. The median value of liquid assets was lower in the treatment than in the comparison
group ($400 and $1,075, respectively). At the same time, on average, early-filing EITC
recipients earned higher annual gross incomes, and received larger tax refunds (federal and state)
and larger federal tax credits (EITC and combined EITC and CTC). Overall, the federal tax
refund provided a substantial financial windfall—accounting for 18.4 percent of the annual gross
income among early filers and 14.5 percent among non-early EITC filers—while EITC benefits
comprised most of the federal tax refund (nearly 57 percent) in both groups. Finally, the level of
material and medical hardship was significantly higher among early filers relative to non-early
filers across all hardship indicators. The incidence and the amount of unsecured debt were also
higher for early EITC filers.
[Insert Table 1 Here]
The differences between the early and non-early filers are consistent with prior evidence
(Grinstein-Weiss et al. 2015). Though early EITC filers have higher incomes and receive larger
refunds, they report greater incidence of material hardship in the months prior to tax filing. Early
filers are also more likely to have dependents and file as heads of household, a proxy for singleparent households which likely face a more pressing set of consumption needs that motivate
early filing compared to non-early filers who are more likely to be single. The EITC also offers a
considerably higher credit to filers with dependents, which may act as an incentive to file early.
The larger reward coupled with greater needs to meet in the household may help explain the
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pattern reflected in Figure 2, which shows that average refund size was largest in the beginning
of the filing season and decreased over time. Refund delays resulting from implementation of the
PATH Act may thus more negatively affect relatively more financially vulnerable households.
[Insert Figure 2 Here]
V.

Analytical Method

We use a difference-in-differences (DID) approach as an identification strategy to examine the
effects of refund delays due to the PATH Act on household hardship experiences and debt levels.
Restricting our sample to EITC recipients, we estimated the following ordinary least squares
(OLS) regression model:
𝑦𝑖𝑗 = 𝛼 + 𝛽𝐸𝑎𝑟𝑙𝑦𝐸𝐼𝑇𝐶𝑖𝑗 + 𝛾𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡16𝑡 + 𝛿(𝐸𝑎𝑟𝑙𝑦𝐸𝐼𝑇𝐶𝑖𝑗 ∙ 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡16𝑡 ) + 𝑿𝒊𝒋 𝜃 + 𝜏𝑗 + 𝜀𝑖𝑗 (1)
where 𝑦𝑖𝑗 is an outcome variable for household i in census division j; 𝐸𝑎𝑟𝑙𝑦𝐸𝐼𝑇𝐶𝑖𝑗 is a dummy
variable equal to 1 for an EITC recipient who filed taxes early in the tax season in a given year,
and 0 otherwise; 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡16𝑡 is an indicator variable equal to 1 for the time period following the
implementation of the PATH Act provisions, and 0 otherwise; 𝑿𝒊𝒋 is a vector of demographic
and financial characteristics; 𝜏𝑗 captures census division fixed effects; and 𝜀𝑖𝑗 is an unobserved
heteroskedasticity-robust error term. The parameter 𝛿 identifies the average change in outcomes
following the implementation of the PATH Act for EITC recipients who filed their taxes early in
the tax season relative to EITC recipients who filed their taxes later in the season.
We relied on the time discontinuity in the new rule’s dates to distinguish between early
EITC filers (treatment group) and non-early EITC filers (comparison group). Since the PATH
Act mandates that the IRS not issue tax refunds to EITC claimants until at least February 15, we
consider EITC recipients who filed their taxes before February 15 as treated households and
EITC recipients who completed their taxes on or after February 15 as comparison households.
15

The ability to observe the exact EITC amounts and the dates of tax filing allows us to precisely
identify treatment and comparison groups. In addition, because the PATH Act did not go into
effect until 2017, we consider 2016 as the pre-treatment period and 2017 as the post-treatment
period. While the composition of our samples differs across survey years, the TTFE eligibility
criteria and the process of sample selection remained stable across the years. We thus expect that
the cohorts of households will be similar over years, even if we do not observe the same
households.3
We focused on two types of outcomes measured six months after tax filing: (1) the
experience of material and medical hardships, and (2) the incidence of unsecured debt. Five
hardship measures include a household’s reported difficulty in making housing payments,
making regular bill payments, affording adequate food, and postponing necessary medical care
and prescription drugs due to cost.4 Each hardship variable is represented as a dichotomous
variable equal to 1 if a household experienced a specific hardship in the six months after tax
filing, and 0 otherwise. An additional two variables were used to quantify the accumulation of
unsecured debt, which includes credit card balances, payday loans, and negative balances in
savings and checking accounts. The first unsecured debt variable is a dummy variable indicating
whether a household held any unsecured debt six months post tax filing. The second unsecured

3

Around 9 percent of the analytical sample appeared in both 2016 and 2017. There are several reasons why we do
not observe the same households across study years: households may not have used TTFE across the years, they
may not have been randomly selected to participate in the survey in both years, they may not have qualified for the
EITC in both years, or they may not have completed two survey waves in both years.
4
To measure material hardship, we relied on survey questions administered six months after tax filing that asked
respondents whether they “did not pay the full amount of the rent or mortgage because [they] could not afford it,”
“skipped paying a bill or paid a bill late due to not having enough money,” and experienced food insecurity in the
past six months. The six-item questionnaire to measure food insecurity was adopted from the U.S. Department of
Agriculture (USDA) questionnaire (USDA, 2018) and indicated whether respondents experienced any food
insecurity. For medical hardship, respondents were asked whether in the past six months they “needed to see a
doctor or go to the hospital but did not go because [they] could not afford it” and “could not fill or postponed filling
a prescription for drugs when they were needed because [they] could not afford it”.
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debt variable signifies the intensity of held debt and is measured as a log-transformed unsecured
debt balance.5 Because both variables are self-reported, the amount of unsecured debt was also
winsorized at the one percent level—i.e., the highest one percent of variable values were
replaced by the value at the 99th percentile.
The vector of covariates includes a large array of demographic and financial
characteristics measured at the time of tax filing, such as household’s experience of any material
or medical hardship six months prior to tax preparation, respondent’s gender, age, age squared,
race/ethnicity, student status, marital status, the number of dependents in a household, highest
educational attainment, employment status, living arrangement, vehicle ownership, the month
and the week of tax filing, household’s participation in the Temporary Assistance for Needy
Families (TANF) and SNAP programs, unsecured debt balance and the value of liquid assets
(log transformed), household’s annual gross income, and the amount of received federal and
state tax refund. We winsorized the values of self-reported values of unsecured debt and liquid
assets at the one percent level and used the exact values of the income and federal tax refund,
both measured through administrative records. Considering that some states did not have a large
number of EITC respondents appearing in our sample, the primary model incorporates census
division rather than state fixed effects.
The key identifying assumption of DID estimation is that the treatment and comparison
groups, on average, would have experienced the same changes in outcomes had the PATH Act
provision not been implemented. There are several reasons why we expect this assumption to
hold. First, prior research has shown that the vast majority of EITC and CTC recipients—91
percent of respondents—were unaware of the upcoming changes in the tax law (Maag, Roll, and

5

A value of one was added when respondents reported no unsecured debt.
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Oliphant 2016). This general lack of knowledge about the new tax refund legislation suggests
that early and non-early EITC recipients were unlikely to have adjusted their financial and tax
filing behaviors in anticipation of the PATH Act rules. A further inspection of basic
characteristics of early and non-early filers across the years showed little difference—with most
differences being statistically or economically insignificant—verifying that the composition of
each group was largely unchanged between 2016 and 2017.6 Notably, educational attainment
levels among early filers, which could potentially be a proxy for greater familiarity about
upcoming changes in the tax code, did not differ across the years. Second, the new legislation
was put into effect in response to broad concerns around tax errors and tax fraud, and was not
targeted at specific groups of EITC claimants. Since the implementation of the PATH Act was
not linked to household characteristics or financial circumstances, the two groups of early and
non-early filers were unlikely to face any unequal pre-treatment changes in outcomes that would
subsequently influence their exposure to treatment. Third, to our knowledge, there were no
simultaneous changes in other federal policies and programs that targeted early but not later
EITC filers. Any policy change influencing all EITC recipients simultaneously would get
absorbed by inclusion of controls for the time trend. Third, the date of February 15 appears
arbitrary and we expect that EITC recipients just below and just above this date discontinuity
would not differ substantially from each other. As a robustness check, we used a number of
alternative date cut-offs to test the sensitivity of our findings to different classifications of early
and non-early filers. Fourth, we expect that restricting the sample to EITC recipients allows us to
compare the dynamics of households with similar underlying needs. We further address this
question by conducting analyses using alternative comparison groups. Finally, it is possible that

6

These results are available upon request.
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there existed some state policies that differentially targeted early and non-early EITC filers
(though it is unlikely that they would have relied on February 15 as a cut-off to separate early
and non-early filers). Controlling for the state tax refund in the main model and including state
fixed effects and census division-year interaction terms in the robustness section helps alleviate
these concerns. For these reasons, we expect that the parallel trends assumption has been met and
our analysis will generate an unbiased estimation of the causal effect of the PACT Act rules on
household financial outcomes.
VI.

Results

A. Patterns of Tax Filing over Time (2016 and 2017)
We begin by illustrating tax filing behaviors over time in 2016 and 2017 for the full sample of
EITC recipients. In Panels A and B in Figure 3, the y-axis corresponds to the proportion of EITC
recipients filing their taxes on each day of the tax filing season, and the x-axis signifies the date
of tax filing. Both panels show that the majority of EITC households filed returns in the first four
weeks of the tax filing season (56.3 percent in 2016 and 57.9 percent in 2017) and a large
fraction of tax filers completed taxes in the last week of the tax season (9.3 percent in 2016 and
9.2 percent in 2017), with the substantial reduction in the rate of tax filing observed during the
intervening weeks.
Considering that the tax filing season dates differed across the years—the filing season
ran between January 19 and April 18 in 2016 and between January 23 and April 18 in 2017—we
used a common unit of measurement to make a robust comparison of tax filing patterns between
the years. That is, in Panel C, the y-axis is defined as above, while the x-axis denotes the number
of days since the beginning of the tax filing season as the proportion of the entire filing season.
Two important insights emerge from the comparison of tax filing trends in Panel C. First, tax
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filing behaviors appeared remarkably similar across the years. While 51.6 percent of EITC filers
completed their taxes before February 15 in 2017, 50.8 percent of EITC recipients filed taxes
during the equivalent time period in 2016. This pattern suggests that, on average, EITC filers
continued to file similarly across the years and did not adjust the timing of tax filing in
substantial ways when the PATH Act went into effect. Second, a non-negligible proportion of
EITC recipients filed their tax returns even before the start of the tax filing season. When
combined with the fact that the majority of EITC recipients filed returns in the first several
weeks of the tax filing season, this finding demonstrates that a considerable share of filers filed
their taxes very early in the tax season and were therefore subject to multiple-week delays in
receiving tax refunds.
[Insert Figure 3 Here]
B. Difference-in-Differences Estimates: Overall Effects
Table 2 presents the DID estimates of the effects of the delayed refunds on the experience of
material hardships, medical hardships, and unsecured debt. Each panel in the table corresponds
to a different sample: Panel A includes the full, least restrictive sample of tax filers (Sample 1),
Panel B restricts the group of early tax filers to those who filed before February 1 and were most
likely to be affected by the PATH Act (Sample 2), and Panel C includes a more limited group of
non-early filers who filed before March 15 and would be more similar to the treatment group
(Sample 3). The coefficient of interest, δ, describes the average changes in outcomes in the
treatment group relative to the comparison group, after the PATH Act provisions took effect in
2017. The table presents estimates on time-invariant differences in baseline outcomes between
early and non-early filers (𝛽) and the time trend common to both groups (𝛾). Each regression
includes the full set of control variables. Statistical significance is interpreted at the 0.05 level.
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[Insert Table 2 Here]
The key finding in Table 2 is that we consistently observe a positive coefficient on the
experience of food insecurity six months post tax filing (Column 5). Specifically, results from
the full sample in Panel A indicate that after the policy change, the likelihood of experiencing
food insecurity was 6.5 percentage points higher (a 17 percent increase from the base level)
among early filers relative to non-early filers. After limiting the treatment group to the very early
filers in Panel B, the coefficient on the interaction term increased to 9.5 percentage points (24
percent from the base level). The larger coefficient magnitude is to be expected considering that
the treatment group in Panel B consists of very early filers who would be expected to experience
disproportionately longer and more consequential refund delays. After excluding very late EITC
filers in Panel C, the coefficient on the interaction variable decreased to 8.3 percentage points
(21 percent from the base level). This attenuation of the impact estimate is not surprising given
that the excluded very late EITC filers were likely more dissimilar to earlier filers across
observed and unobserved characteristics. Taken together, these findings demonstrate the
increased incidence of food insecurity among early EITC recipients in comparison with nonearly EITC recipients following the introduction of policy that delayed the delivery of tax
refunds to certain groups of households.
Exploring the coefficients beyond the interaction terms in Column 5 provides a more
comprehensive picture of the experience of food insecurity following the tax reform. While the
coefficient on the early filer indicator suggests that there were no significant differences in
average levels of food insecurity at baseline between the treatment and comparison groups, the
coefficient on the time dummy points to a statistically significant downward trend in the rate of
food insecurity in the comparison group over time. This pattern is observed for each sample. Our
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results therefore seem to indicate that while households that were unaffected by the refund delay
saw a reduction in the experience of food insecurity over time, those that experienced delays in
receiving their federal tax refunds did not experience the same secular improvements in food
insecurity between 2016 and 2017.7
Finally, we did not observe statistically significant effects of the PATH Act for other
hardships and unsecured debt outcomes for the full sample (Table 2, Panel A). However, a
statistically significant negative coefficient was detected for the likelihood of skipping housing
payments in the most restrictive sample (Table 2, Panel C, Column 1), indicating that after the
introduction of the PATH Act rules, treatment households faced a 7.2 percentage point lower
probability of skipping housing payments than comparison households. We explore this finding
further in a series of robustness checks below.
C. Difference-in-Differences Estimates: Heterogeneous Effects
While Table 2 reports the average effects of the PATH Act on hardship and debt outcomes,
findings in Tables 3 and 4 demonstrate the extent to which these estimates varied by the median
size of the federal tax refund and the ability to come up with $2,000 in the event of an
emergency. This analysis was conducted for the full sample of EITC households (Sample 1).
Our findings illustrate some heterogeneity in PATH Act impacts and that adverse effects
appear more pronounced for financially more vulnerable households. In Table 3, the magnitude
of the negative coefficient on food insecurity was larger for EITC recipients who received a
federal tax refund above the median amount ($1,493 or more), though both estimates lacked
precision. In Table 4, we observe a relative increase in food insecurity following the tax reform
for liquidity-constrained EITC filers who could not access $2,000 in an emergency but not for

7

It is worth noting that similar—though more muted—trends in the comparison group are observed even when
regressions do not include covariate variables.
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those with better access to emergency liquidity. Among the EITC recipients who reported that
they probably or certainly could not access emergency savings in a short timeframe, the refund
delay brought an increase in food insecurity by 11.2 percentage points for early filers relative to
non-early filers.
[Insert Table 3 Here]
[Insert Table 4 Here]
D. Patterns in Tax Filing Dates between 2016 and 2018
While households experienced adverse effects of the PATH Act in the short run, it is unclear
whether the effects would persist in the future, as EITC recipients in 2018 may have learned
about the tax reform from the prior year and have adjusted their financial and tax filing
behaviors. For example, after experiencing delays in receiving tax refunds in 2017, early filers in
2018 may have chosen to postpone their tax filing date by a few weeks to avoid the uncertainty
around the timing in receiving their tax refunds or they may have changed their consumption in
anticipation of refund delays. To examine the degree to which households may be adjusting their
behavior in response to the delay, we replicated Figure 3 by plotting the patterns of tax filing
over time for EITC recipients between 2016 and 2018. Figure 4 reveals that one year after the
introduction of the PATH Act, tax filers have generally not delayed the timing of completing
their tax returns and the majority of EITC filers continued to be subject to the PATH Act delays
in 2018. In fact, the EITC filers in our sample appeared insensitive to the start of the filing
season on January 29th—which came relatively late in comparison to prior years—and a nonnegligible fraction of filers completed their refunds before the tax season. A similar conclusion
can be drawn when limiting the sample to EITC households that appeared in both 2017 and
2018: the median tax filing date was February 14th in 2017 and February 8th in 2018 for these
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households. The likely incidence of delays in receiving the federal tax refund, therefore, was
high even one year after the tax reform.
[Insert Figure 4 Here]
E. Robustness Checks
We examine the robustness of our findings to the specification of alternative comparison groups,
the incorporation of additional years of data, and the inclusion of additional controls.
The analysis so far has contrasted the average outcomes for early and non-early tax filers
that received the EITC. While treated households appeared relatively dissimilar to comparison
households (Table 1), these baseline differences will not invalidate the identification strategy if
both groups would have experienced identical average changes in outcomes in the absence of the
policy, and if EITC filers in 2016 did not systematically adjust their filing behaviors in 2017. We
constructed several alternative comparison groups to test the robustness of our main results. The
first alternative comparison group includes early filing non-EITC LMI filers who, like early
EITC recipients, may have been similarly impatient to receive their federal tax refunds and may
have only marginally missed qualifying for the EITC (Table 5, Panel A). The finding on the
experience of food insecurity was consistent with prior results, showing the relative increase in
the likelihood of food insecurity for early EITC recipients relative to early non-EITC recipients
after the tax reform, though the coefficient was not significant at the 0.05 level. This indicates
that the food insecurity impacts observed in the main analysis are a function of both receiving the
EITC and filing early rather than filing early in general, providing additional evidence that these
effects are due to the delay in the tax refund. For the second robustness check, we limited treated
households to the earliest EITC filers who completed their taxes before February 1st, and the
comparison group was limited to the EITC recipients who filed taxes between February 1st and
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February 28th or 29th (Table 5, Panel B). This sample restriction helps isolate early tax filers who
have been severely affected by the PATH Act and tax filers who have been less affected or
barely unaffected by the refund delay. The findings remain consistent in showing a relative
increase in the likelihood of experiencing food insecurity (by 7.2 percentage points). The results
also point to a relative drop in the probability of skipping housing payments (by 7.5 percentage
points) between the treatment and comparison group after the tax reform.
In Panel C (Table 5) we used Coarsened Exact Matching (CEM) in combination with the
DID analysis to estimate the impacts of the refund delay for a sample of more balanced treatment
and comparison households (Iacus, King, and Porro 2011). CEM is a matching technique that
“coarsens” selected variables into groups and generates different strata based on variable values.
Treatment and comparison observations are then matched into strata based on the presence of at
least one exact match, so that a single treatment (comparison) observation can be matched to
multiple comparison (treatment) observations. Strata that do not contain any matches are
dropped from the analysis.8 We estimated Equation 1 following the matching procedure and
employed weights to correct for different numbers of treatment and comparison households
within each strata. The positive coefficient from the estimates incorporating CEM is consistent
with prior findings, though it was not statistically significant at the conventional level.
[Insert Table 5 Here]
The three analyses using alternative comparison groups support our prior conclusions
about the relative increase in the incidence of food insecurity. Interestingly, some evidence also

8

The following variables were used to match early and non-early EITC filers: year, census division, filing status, the
presence of dependents, employment status, student status, gross annual income, and the EITC value. The
continuous income and EITC variables were coarsened into dummy variables describing whether annual gross
income and the EITC were above or below the sample median (roughly $13,000 and $500, respectively). Remaining
variables were categorical and exact variable values were used for matching.
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points to the negative coefficient on the likelihood of skipping housing payments. While the
exact mechanism for this result is unclear, one possible explanation is that spending on rent or
mortgage is relatively inflexible and carries high costs if households are unable to make timely
payments on these items. After experiencing delays in receiving their federal refund, EITC
recipients may choose to reduce other more flexible consumption (e.g., food) in favor of meeting
meet their obligations on less flexible payments (e.g., housing).
In the second set of robustness tests (Table 6), we incorporated data on EITC recipients
from other years. First, we performed a placebo test by using data from multiple pre-treatment
years. Using data from 2015 and 2016, we re-estimated the main DID analysis to compare early
and non-early EITC filers across the years prior to the introduction of PATH Act rules (Table 6,
Panel A).9 While Panel A reports findings only for the full sample, the analysis was conducted
for all three samples of treatment and comparison groups (Samples 1-3). We find that
coefficients in each model using data from pre-treatment years were statistically insignificant at
the 0.1 level, increasing our confidence that the previously estimated relative differences in
hardships between the treatment and comparison households can be attributed to the changes in
the tax law. Furthermore, rather than relying on a single post-treatment year, we have included
data for both 2017 and 2018 to generate the two-year post-treatment period. The effects of the
tax reform on the experience of food insecurity remained robust when we included samples from
both 2017 and 2018 in the DID analysis (Table 6, Panels B and C).
[Insert Table 6 Here]
In the final set of analyses (Table 7), we explored how adding state fixed effects to
account for time-invariant state-specific factors, clustering standard errors by zip codes to

9

Surveys prior to the second wave of 2016 did not use the USDA-based questionnaire to measure food insecurity.
The analysis using 2015 and 2016 years relies on the simplified financial insecurity measure.
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account for intra-group correlation within smaller geographies, and interacting census division
and a year to account for time-varying regional changes affected our results. The positive
coefficient on the likelihood of experiencing food insecurity was robust across each of these
specifications (Table 7, Panels A-C).
[Insert Table 7 Here]
VII.

Conclusion and Discussion

This study uses a unique dataset combining administrative tax and longitudinal survey data to
study the impacts of the recently implemented PATH Act—which delays issuance of federal
income tax refunds for EITC and ACTC filers until at least February 15—on household hardship
and unsecured debt outcomes in the six months following tax filing. We observe that EITC
recipients do not adjust their behavior in response to the delay in receiving their tax refund; the
tax filing patterns of EITC recipients are similar in 2016 and 2017, which immediately precede
and follow the implementation of the PATH Act rules. Second, our difference-in-differences
analysis reveals that the incidence of reported food insecurity six months after tax filing
increased among early EITC filers relative to non-early EITC filers after the implementation of
the PATH Act. This finding is consistently observed across different analytic samples and model
specifications. Additional analyses suggest that these negative effects are disproportionately
larger for more economically vulnerable households. Finally, some of our findings also suggest
that the relative incidence of skipped housing bills decreased among early EITC filers relative to
later EITC filers after the refund delay. However, these results are sensitive to model and sample
specifications.
We draw several conclusions from our analysis. First, the sensitivity of household food
insecurity to the refund delay indicates that changes to food consumption may be one of the first
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and primary strategies households follow when faced with a liquidity shock. This finding is not
surprising given that households can choose from an array of options in adjusting their food
consumption, including purchasing less expensive food, reducing the size of meals, or skipping
meals. This is consistent with prior evidence showing that food consumption is very sensitive to
income fluctuations, and that low-income families respond to food shortages by forgoing desired
food items, cutting meal portions, and reducing the frequency of meals to alleviate the
experience of food hardship (Heflin, London, and Scott 2011). The sensitivity of food security to
changes in liquidity speaks to the possibility that LMI households may prefer to adjust their food
consumption rather than skip other necessities like housing or utility payments, as the potential
consequences of forgoing those payments may be more severe (e.g., eviction, utility shut-offs).
Furthermore, LMI households may be better able to absorb the impact of refund delays with
respect to bill payments by shifting those payments to the future (e.g., paying the minimum on
credit cards or falling slightly behind on a rent payment) with relatively few consequences, but
this is not true for food consumption—a skipped meal remains a skipped meal.
Second, this research provides evidence that even relatively short—though likely
unexpected—several week delays in tax refunds caused by the PATH Act may potentially and
partially offset the positive impacts on food security attributed to the EITC and other federal
programs, such as SNAP (McGranahan and Schanzenbach 2013; Ratcliffe, McKernan, and
Zhang 2011). Considering these adverse effects of the PATH Act provision on early filers,
policymakers should consider the possibility of developing alternative, more effective methods
to detect errors in EITC claims. Since most EITC errors are related to the complexity of tax rules
rather than fraud (Greenstein, Wancheck, and Marr 2019), one way to reduce the rate and
amount of overpayments would be to adjust the rules of federal withholding. For example,
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assuming that the goal of policymakers is not necessarily to stop issuing erroneous payments,
erroneous EITC claims could be addressed after the fact by increasing the amount withheld from
paychecks for erroneous claimants over the course of the subsequent year, rather than delaying
the tax refunds for the vast majority of tax filers who appropriately claim the credit. Another way
to enforce greater compliance with EITC rules and counteract overpayments would be by
securing more adequate resources to administer the delivery of tax credits. As the budget for IRS
enforcement activities has been decreasing over time (Greenstein, Wancheck, and Marr 2019),
an increase in enforcement funding and adoption of more effective auditing strategies may
increase tax compliance, reduce tax fraud and errors, and increase the amount of collected taxes
across the income spectrum without putting an additional financial strain on low-income
households.
Finally, if the PATH Act rules persist into the future, it will be important to provide LMI
households with adequate financial and informational resources to counteract the negative effects
of refund delays. For example, policymakers could establish some type of presumptive eligibility
benefits to offer temporary financial assistance to households likely to be eligible for the EITC,
provide interim short-term nutrition assistance benefits, or more generally facilitate access to
SNAP for qualifying households. Streamlined and timely delivery of state credits and benefits
(e.g., state EITCs) will become increasingly crucial in providing the affected households with
liquidity while they wait for a federal refund. Beyond financial assistance, policymakers and
practitioners will have to be actively engaged in efforts to raise awareness of PATH Act
provisions among LMI households prior to the tax season. Maag et al. (2016) show that over
nine-tenths of early filers who received the EITC did not know about the potential for refund
delays in advance of the PATH Act. While many LMI households may have experienced the
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delay over the course of several years, they may still not understand that this delay is now built
into the tax filing process and will persist in future years. Efforts to raise LMI tax filer awareness
could take place through companies participating in the IRS’ Free File Alliance, communitybased organizations, faith communities, companies sponsoring Volunteer Income Tax Assistance
(VITA) sites, and local departments of social services. Employers could also include brief
informational messages about PATH Act refund delays with their annual communication about
W2 form availability prior to tax season.
This study contributes to the literature in several ways. First, to our knowledge, only a
single study has investigated the impact of the PATH Act for low-income households, finding
that refund delays affect spending on essential purchases, such as groceries and non-durable
goods (Aladangady et al., 2018). Besides the unique contribution to the scarce literature on the
recent PATH Act reform and on the timing of refund payments in general, an additional
advantage of our study is that we use administrative individual-level tax data to precisely
estimate which households receive the EITC, the amount of federal tax refund they receive, and
the exact date of tax filing. Second, this paper contributes to the broader literature examining the
relationship between transitory income shocks and household consumption behaviors and
hardships. Our findings are consistent with other studies showing that the experience of shocks is
associated with increased food hardship (Leete and Bania 2010; McKernan, Ratcliffe, and
Vinopal 2009) and that a temporary withholding of paychecks can result in lower consumption
(Gelman et al. 2018; Baker and Yannelis 2017). In comparison to these studies, our research
focuses explicitly on the LMI population and, unlike other studies exploring experience of
hardship (Leete and Bania 2010; McKernan, Ratcliffe, and Vinopal 2009), we are able to
precisely measure an income shock in the form of a delayed large lump sum payment. Lastly, as
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other studies on the federal EITC have primarily examined outcomes relating to employment
(Hoynes and Patel 2018), poverty (Meyer 2010) or health (Averett and Wang 2013), this study
extends the EITC literature by examining previously unexplored household hardships in the
months after tax filing.
Despite this study’s contributions to the literature, this work is not without its limitations.
First, while tax filers claiming the EITC or the ACTC were instructed not to expect their tax
refunds until the week of February 27, we cannot precisely determine the actual length of delays
in refund liquidity experienced by early filers in our sample, though Alandagady et al. (2018)
find that EITC payments after the PATH Act peaked about two weeks later than prior years.
Second, this study reports only the immediate effects of the PATH Act in the six months postfiling: it is unclear whether the adverse impact on household hardships would persist in the long
run or whether EITC filers would adjust their financial and tax filing behaviors over time to
avoid the negative effects of the reform. Third, this analysis focuses only on EITC recipients and
does not provide evidence on the impact of the new provision for households that claimed but
did not receive the EITC or the ACTC as well as those who received the ACTC but not the
EITC. However, since less than one percent of sampled LMI filers received the ACTC without
receiving the EITC, the latter issue is unlikely to be a concern in this research. Relatedly, our
sample of EITC recipients represents a specific group of tax filers who used TTFE to complete
their taxes and does not include EITC recipients that filed taxes in other ways, such as through
Volunteer Income Tax Assistance sites or by using tax preparers or non-TTFE online tax
software services. In particular, compared to the general population of EITC recipients in 2016,
our sample consists of a higher proportion of households without claimed dependents, and the
average EITC amount in our sample is substantially lower than the national average (Falk and
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Crandall-Hollick 2018). As such, there are limitations to the generalizability of our findings to
the full population of EITC recipients.
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TABLES
Table 1: Baseline Sample Characteristics (Full Sample), 2016
Early filers (<Feb 15)
Mean (S.D.)
0.578
37.7
0.736
0.108
0.029
0.071
0.057
0.268
0.206
0.525
0.792
0.06
0.148
0.163
0.339
0.299
0.199
0.402
0.254
0.198
0.145
0.227
0.281
0.49
0.233
0.573
0.195
0.762
0.865
0.372
0.324
0.536
400
18,002 (12,320)
3,320 (2,766)
327 (505)
1,895 (1,825)
2,049 (1,841)

Late filers (Feb 15+)
Mean (S.D.)
0.543
38.2
0.731
0.074
0.06
0.083
0.054
0.217
0.186
0.597
0.728
0.073
0.198
0.098
0.275
0.311
0.316
0.646
0.189
0.101
0.064
0.249
0.388
0.363
0.208
0.529
0.263
0.738
0.856
0.255
0.298
0.510
1,075
13,656 (11,266)
1,988 (2,260)
254 (467)
1,120 (1,498)
1,204 (1,541)

Diff.:
p-values
0.047
0.165
0.073
0.001
0.000
0.195
0.749
0.001
0.149
0.000
0.000
0.131
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.468
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.165
0.000
0.000
0.092
0.013
0.000
0.111
0.455
0.000
0.106
0.127
n/a
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000

Female
Age (years)
Non-Hispanic White
Non-Hispanic Black
Nin-Hispanic Asian
Hispanic
Other
Married
Unmarried with partner
Unmarried without partner
Non-student
Full-time student
Part-time student
High school degree or less
Some college
Bachelor’s degree
Higher than Bachelor’s
No. of dependents: 0
No. of dependents: 1
No. of dependents: 2
No. of dependents: 3+
Not employed
Employed part-time
Employed full-time
Lives in owned house/apt
Lives in rented house/apt
Neither owns nor rents
Owns a vehicle
Insured
Receives TANF of SNAP
Unexpected income shock (past 6 mo)
Unexpected expense shock (past 6 mo)
Value of liquid assets1 (median, $)
Annual gross income ($)
Federal tax refund ($)
State tax refund ($)
Federal EITC ($)
Federal EITC and CTC ($)
Outcome Variables (measured at HFS1)
Skipped housing payment (past 6 mo)
0.234
0.163
0.000
Skipped bills or late bills (past 6 mo)
0.555
0.415
0.000
Skipped medical care (past 6 mo)
0.314
0.285
0.070
Skipped prescription drugs (past 6 mo)
0.246
0.206
0.007
Experienced food insecurity (past 6 mo)1
0.381
0.304
0.000
Unsecured debt
0.703
0.627
0.000
Unsecured debt balance1 ($)
3,053 (128)
2,608 (135)
0.017
Observations
1,784
1,462
Notes: Comparison of means using t-test. aValues are topcoded at the one percent level. bThe measure of food
insecurity used in the first wave of the 2016 survey differed from the one used in subsequent survey waves.
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Table 2: Difference-in-Differences Estimates
Skipped
Skipped
Skipped
Experienced
bills or
medical prescription
food
late
care
drugs
insecurity
bills
(3)
(4)
(5)
(2)
Panel A: Sample 1—Early filers=before Feb 15; Non-early filers=Feb 15 and after
Early filer × Post 2016
0.001
-0.002
0.018
-0.017
0.065
(0.024)
(0.027)
(0.028)
(0.025)
(0.028)
Early filer
-0.032
-0.041
0.009
0.074
-0.019
(0.033)
(0.039)
(0.040)
(0.036)
(0.040)
Post 2016
-0.025
-0.059
-0.014
0.001
-0.091
(0.016)
(0.019)
(0.020)
(0.017)
(0.021)
Skipped
housing
payments
(1)

Observations
R-squared

5,333
0.192

5,333
0.370

5,333
0.204

5,333
0.189

5,333
0.310

Panel B: Sample 2—Early filers=before Feb 1; Non-early filers=Feb 15 and after
Early filer × Post 2016
-0.039
-0.014
0.036
-0.054
0.095
(0.031)
(0.033)
(0.033)
(0.030)
(0.033)
Early filer
-0.174
-0.017
-0.119
-0.083
-0.075
(0.098)
(0.077)
(0.095)
(0.098)
(0.084)
Post 2016
-0.023
-0.058
-0.015
0.002
-0.092
(0.016)
(0.019)
(0.020)
(0.017)
(0.020)
Observations
R-squared

3,890
0.203

3,890
0.377

3,890
0.214

3,890
0.205

3,890
0.324

Panel C: Sample 3—Early filers=before Feb 1; Non-early filers=Feb 15–Mar 15
Early filer × Post 2016
-0.072
0.005
0.032
-0.040
0.083
(0.036)
(0.039)
(0.040)
(0.037)
(0.040)
Early filer
-0.072
0.004
-0.024
-0.172
-0.148
(0.087)
(0.078)
(0.084)
(0.091)
(0.102)
Post 2016
0.010
-0.075
-0.008
-0.014
-0.080
(0.025)
(0.028)
(0.030)
(0.027)
(0.030)

Had
unsecured
debt
(6)

Amt. of
unsecured
debt
(7)

0.008
(0.026)
-0.056
(0.036)
0.014
(0.019)

-0.046
(0.186)
-0.409
(0.258)
0.196
(0.135)

5,333
0.354

5,333
0.477

0.044
(0.030)
-0.030
(0.086)
0.015
(0.019)

0.233
(0.218)
-0.531
(0.587)
0.203
(0.135)

3,890
0.361

3,890
0.485

0.044
(0.037)
-0.014
(0.084)
0.016
(0.028)

0.272
(0.264)
0.406
(0.566)
0.157
(0.201)

Observations
2,564
2,564
2,564
2,564
2,564
2,564
2,564
R-squared
0.215
0.386
0.211
0.211
0.327
0.359
0.476
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. Each regression includes the following controls: baseline measure of
any material and medical hardship, respondent’s gender, age, age squared, race/ethnicity, student status, marital
status, number of dependents, educational attainment, employment status, living arrangement, vehicle ownership,
the month and the week of tax filing, receipt of TANF and SNAP benefits, unsecured debt balance and the value of
liquid assets, household’s annual gross income, and the amount of federal and state tax refund.
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Table 3: Difference-in-Differences Estimates, By Refund Size (Early filers=before Feb 15; Nonearly filers=Feb 15 and after)
Skipped
housing
payments
(1)
Panel A: Below Sample Median
Early filer × Post 2016
-0.026
(0.034)
Early filer
-0.018
(0.044)
Post 2016
-0.012
(0.019)
Observations
R-squared

2,667
0.190

Panel B: Sample Median and Above
Early filer × Post 2016
0.040
(0.036)
Early filer
-0.050
(0.052)
Post 2016
-0.050
(0.029)

Skipped
bills or
late bills
(2)

Skipped
medical
care
(3)

Skipped
prescription
drugs
(4)

Experienced
food
insecurity
(5)

Had
unsecured
debt
(6)

Amt. of
unsecured
debt
(7)

-0.026
(0.039)
-0.035
(0.055)
-0.049
(0.024)

-0.024
(0.040)
-0.007
(0.056)
0.004
(0.025)

-0.007
(0.035)
0.032
(0.049)
0.024
(0.022)

0.034
(0.043)
-0.036
(0.056)
-0.092
(0.026)

-0.009
(0.040)
-0.045
(0.050)
0.016
(0.025)

-0.262
(0.285)
-0.207
(0.352)
0.187
(0.171)

2,667
0.375

2,667
0.231

2,667
0.211

2,667
0.323

2,667
0.351

2,667
0.472

0.020
(0.041)
-0.053
(0.056)
-0.067
(0.032)

0.062
(0.041)
0.012
(0.057)
-0.042
(0.033)

0.004
(0.038)
0.102
(0.054)
-0.038
(0.030)

0.081
(0.042)
-0.000
(0.060)
-0.086
(0.034)

0.018
(0.037)
-0.074
(0.052)
0.012
(0.030)

0.001
(0.273)
-0.627
(0.387)
0.265
(0.223)

Observations
2,666
2,666
2,666
2,666
2,666
2,666
2,666
R-squared
0.203
0.360
0.199
0.186
0.303
0.355
0.474
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. Each regression includes the following controls: baseline measure of
any material and medical hardship, respondent’s gender, age, age squared, race/ethnicity, student status, marital
status, number of dependents, educational attainment, employment status, living arrangement, vehicle ownership,
the month and the week of tax filing, receipt of TANF and SNAP benefits, unsecured debt balance and the value of
liquid assets, household’s annual gross income, and the amount of federal and state tax refund.
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Table 4: Difference-in-Differences Estimates, By Access to Liquidity (Early filers=before Feb
15; Non-early filers=Feb 15 and after)
Skipped
Skipped
housing
bills or
payments late bills
(1)
(2)
Panel A: Could Access $2,000 in an Emergency
Early filer × Post 2016
-0.023
-0.033
(0.026)
(0.038)
Early filer
-0.021
0.050
(0.033)
(0.049)
Post 2016
-0.042
-0.059
(0.015)
(0.024)
Observations
R-squared

2,529
0.157

2,529
0.288

Skipped
medical
care
(3)

Skipped
prescription
drugs
(4)

Experienced
food
insecurity
(5)

Had
unsecured
debt
(6)

Amt. of
unsecured
debt
(7)

0.012
(0.036)
0.006
(0.051)
-0.011
(0.023)

-0.001
(0.029)
0.083
(0.041)
0.014
(0.018)

-0.009
(0.042)
0.066
(0.061)
-0.062
(0.028)

0.000
(0.038)
-0.033
(0.055)
0.028
(0.027)

-0.097
(0.269)
-0.145
(0.402)
0.244
(0.188)

2,529
0.166

2,529
0.149

2,529
0.252

2,529
0.347

2,529
0.468

-0.024
(0.041)
0.066
(0.058)
-0.017
(0.032)

0.112
(0.038)
-0.101
(0.053)
-0.099
(0.030)

0.027
(0.036)
-0.085
(0.045)
-0.005
(0.027)

0.048
(0.258)
-0.734
(0.322)
0.129
(0.194)

Panel B: Could not Access $2,000 in an Emergency
Early filer × Post 2016
0.007
-0.005
0.020
(0.040)
(0.040)
(0.043)
Early filer
-0.038
-0.123
0.008
(0.057)
(0.058)
(0.061)
Post 2016
-0.007
-0.034
-0.009
(0.031)
(0.031)
(0.033)

Observations
2,804
2,804
2,804
2,804
2,804
2,804
2,804
R-squared
0.159
0.257
0.189
0.158
0.190
0.372
0.494
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. Each regression includes the following controls: baseline measure of
any material and medical hardship, respondent’s gender, age, age squared, race/ethnicity, student status, marital
status, number of dependents, educational attainment, employment status, living arrangement, vehicle ownership,
the month and the week of tax filing, receipt of TANF and SNAP benefits, unsecured debt balance and the value of
liquid assets, household’s annual gross income, and the amount of federal and state tax refund.
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Table 5: Robustness Checks, Alternative Comparison Groups
Skipped Skipped Skipped
Skipped
Experienced
housing
bills or
medical prescription
food
payments late bills
care
drugs
insecurity
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
Panel A: Alternative Comparison Group (Non-EITC Early Filers=before Feb 15)
Early filer × Post 2016
-0.032
0.004
0.026
-0.023
0.039
(0.017)
(0.020)
(0.020)
(0.018)
(0.021)
Observations
R-squared

6,409
0.192

6,409
0.381

6,409
0.218

6,409
0.199

6,409
0.323

Had
unsecured
debt
(6)

Amt. of
unsecured
debt
(7)

0.009
(0.020)

0.056
(0.141)

6,409
0.315

6,409
0.439

Panel B: Alternative Comparison Group (Early Filers<Feb 1; Non-Early Filers=Feb 1–Feb 28/29)
Early filer × Post 2016
-0.075
-0.021
0.065
-0.031
0.072
0.043
(0.031)
(0.034)
(0.034)
(0.031)
(0.033)
(0.031)
Observations
R-squared

3,525
0.198

3,525
0.368

Panel C: Matched Comparison Group (CEM)
Early filer × Post 2016
0.006
0.009
(0.028)
(0.031)

0.349
(0.223)

3,525
0.197

3,525
0.189

3,525
0.307

3,525
0.351

3,525
0.469

0.024
(0.033)

-0.008
(0.030)

0.059
(0.033)

0.031
(0.030)

0.074
(0.220)

Observations
4,999
4,999
4,999
4,999
4,999
4,999
4,999
R-squared
0.202
0.374
0.196
0.186
0.305
0.361
0.477
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. Each regression includes the following controls: baseline measure of
any material and medical hardship, respondent’s gender, age, age squared, race/ethnicity, student status, marital
status, number of dependents, educational attainment, employment status, living arrangement, vehicle ownership,
the month and the week of tax filing, receipt of TANF and SNAP benefits, unsecured debt balance and the value of
liquid assets, household’s annual gross income, and the amount of federal and state tax refund.
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Table 6: Robustness Checks, Alternative Years
Skipped Skipped
housing
bills or
payments late bills
(1)
(2)
Panel A: Using 2015 and 2016 Samples
Early filer × Post 2015
-0.005
0.001
(0.019)
(0.022)
Observations
R-squared

6,135
0.175

6,135
0.369

Skipped
medical
care
(3)

Skipped
prescription
drugs
(4)

Experienced
food
insecurity
(5)

Had
unsecured
debt
(6)

Amt. of
unsecured
debt
(7)

0.004
(0.023)

0.015
(0.021)

-0.020
(0.023)

-0.007
(0.021)

-0.051
(0.152)

6,135
0.209

6,135
0.191

6,135
0.255

6,135
0.359

6,135
0.471

-0.026
(0.021)

0.063
(0.025)

0.013
(0.023)

-0.002
(0.165)

6,175
0.192

6,175
0.321

6,175
0.356

6,175
0.476

0.004
(0.025)
0.041
(0.031)

-0.083
(0.181)
0.206
(0.232)

Panel B: Using 2017 and 2018 as the Post-treatment Period
Early filer × Post 2016
-0.006
-0.004
0.007
(0.021)
(0.024)
(0.024)
Observations
R-squared

6,175
0.188

6,175
0.368

6,175
0.216

Panel C: Using 2017 and 2018 as the Post-treatment Period (Year Dummy Controls)
Early filer × Y2017
-0.004
-0.002
0.008
-0.027
0.065
(0.023)
(0.026)
(0.027)
(0.024)
(0.027)
Early filer × Y2018
-0.009
-0.001
0.004
-0.024
0.069
(0.027)
(0.032)
(0.031)
(0.028)
(0.033)

Observations
6,175
6,175
6,175
6,175
6,175
6,175
6,175
R-squared
0.188
0.369
0.216
0.192
0.323
0.359
0.477
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. Each regression includes the following controls: baseline measure of
any material and medical hardship, respondent’s gender, age, age squared, race/ethnicity, student status, marital
status, number of dependents, educational attainment, employment status, living arrangement, vehicle ownership,
the month and the week of tax filing, receipt of TANF and SNAP benefits, unsecured debt balance and the value of
liquid assets, household’s annual gross income, and the amount of federal and state tax refund.
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Table 7: Robustness Checks, Other Specifications
Skipped
housing
payments
(1)
Panel A: Including State Dummies
Early filer × Post 2016
0.002
(0.024)
Observations
R-squared

5,333
0.200

Skipped
bills or
late bills
(2)

Skipped
medical
care
(3)

Skipped
prescription
drugs
(4)

Experienced
food
insecurity
(5)

Had
unsecured
debt
(6)

Amt. of
unsecured
debt
(7)

0.002
(0.027)

0.018
(0.028)

-0.013
(0.025)

0.063
(0.028)

0.008
(0.026)

-0.058
(0.187)

5,333
0.376

5,333
0.215

5,333
0.198

5,333
0.315

5,333
0.358

5,333
0.480

0.017
(0.027)

-0.015
(0.025)

0.067
(0.028)

0.005
(0.026)

-0.085
(0.188)

5,305
0.204

5,305
0.188

5,305
0.310

5,305
0.353

5,305
0.477

-0.014
(0.025)

0.066
(0.028)

0.009
(0.026)

-0.036
(0.188)

Panel B: Including Clustering by Zip Codes
Early filer × Post 2016
0.002
-0.001
(0.024)
(0.027)
Observations
R-squared

5,305
0.192

5,305
0.370

Panel C: Including Census Division & Year Interactions
Early filer × Post 2016
0.002
-0.006
0.013
(0.024)
(0.027)
(0.028)

Observations
5,333
5,333
5,333
5,333
5,333
5,333
5,333
R-squared
0.193
0.372
0.208
0.192
0.313
0.355
0.478
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. Each regression includes the following controls: baseline measure of
any material and medical hardship, respondent’s gender, age, age squared, race/ethnicity, student status, marital
status, number of dependents, educational attainment, employment status, living arrangement, vehicle ownership,
the month and the week of tax filing, receipt of TANF and SNAP benefits, unsecured debt balance and the value of
liquid assets, household’s annual gross income, and the amount of federal and state tax refund.
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FIGURES
Figure 2: Average Amount of Federal Tax Refund, 2016 and 2017
Panel A: Average Federal Tax Refund in 2016

Panel B: Average Federal Tax Refund in 2017

Notes: N=3,246 in 2016 and N=2,087 in 2017. Red horizontal line signifies the average federal
tax refund amount for the 2016 tax filing season.
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Figure 3: Tax Filing in 2016 and 2017
Panel A: Tax Filing in 2016

Panel B: Tax Filing in 2017
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Panel C: Tax Filing in 2016 and 2017

Notes: N=3,246 in 2016 and N=2,087 in 2017.
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Figure 4: Tax Filing in 2016–2018
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